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1.  INTRODUCTION 
An agenda of economic reform encompassing a broad range of structural 
adjustment policies (SAP) is underway in Pakistan since 1987-88. These policies 
have an adverse impact on the pace of economic growth and created more poverty 
and inequality in the country [see Bengali and Ahmed (2002); Kemal (2003)]. These 
studies argues that during the last fifteen years each government is trying to stabilise 
the economy even at the cost of economic growth and delivery of social services. 
The negative impact of stabilisation policies on economic growth of the country is 
reflected in the decline of GDP growth from an average annual growth of 4.6 percent 
during 1990s as compared to 6.5 percent during 1980s. Similarly, negligence of 
social services delivery is reflected in the recent UNDP Report (2003), which, show 
that the ranking of Pakistan has slipped from 136 to 141 along with the decline in 
many other social sector statistics. The top government officials now also recognise 
these facts and the relapse of growth oriented policy can be heard more often.  
Trend in public finance statistics of the country clearly indicate that one of the 
important victim of stabilisation policies are the expenditures of provincial 
governments. In last several years the significant portion of onus of containment of 
fiscal deficit has been shifted towards the provincial governments. The onus of 
containment of fiscal deficit by all four provincial governments during the last 
decade has increased from 18 percent to 50 percent, which has devastating impact on 
the service provision and poverty reduction. 
Despite, the vast body of literature on stabilisation policies and its impact on 
economy and social sector expenditures, it is one of the pioneering work in Pakistan 
to explore the mechanism through which federal government stabilisation policies 
affect the social sector expenditures of the provincial government which 
subsequently result in decline in social sector indicators. The rest of the paper is 
organised as follow. Section two provides the details related to the calculation of 
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fiscal deficit and highlight the mechanism through which burden of stabilisation 
transfers on provincial governments. Section three analyses the impact of the burden 
of stabilisation on the social services and poverty reduction. Section four offers 
policy implications and conclusions. 
 
2.  COMPUTATION OF FISCAL DEFICIT 
Conceptually, fiscal deficit is simply the difference between total revenues 
and total expenditure, with the former including both tax revenues and non-tax 
revenues and the latter including both current and development expenditure.  
However, the computation of the fiscal deficit in practical world is slightly 
complicated and there are many issues, which require consideration prior to the 
computations of fiscal deficit at aggregate level. On the expenditure side, repayments 
of foreign debt are not the part of fiscal deficit computation because it is used for 
reduction in outstanding debt and, thereby, contributes to reducing liabilities and 
therefore it is excluded from the total expenditures of the government. Another 
important issue is related to the inclusion of development expenditures in federal or 
provincial expenditures.  
On the revenue side, both tax and non-tax revenues are added after deduction 
of provincial share in revenues to obtain federal net revenue receipts then federal 
fiscal deficit is compute. Subsequently the combined fiscal deficit is simply the sum 
of the overall deficit of the federal government minus the revenue surplus of the 
provincial governments.  Therefore, we have the formula for computing the 
consolidated fiscal deficit of the federal and provincial governments as follows: 
Fiscal deficit = federal current expenditure + development expenditure (PSDP) 
 – net federal revenue receipts—self-financing of PSDP by 
provinces 
 – repayment of foreign debt—loan recovery from provinces + 
net lending to others—Provincial Surplus 
 
1.  Containment of Fiscal Deficit by Provinces 
Table 1 presents a comprehensive overall fiscal deficit and details of the 
provincial component, which play a significant role in the reduction of overall fiscal 
deficit. It shows that if the provincial contribution is removed, the overall fiscal 
deficit increases by the amount equal to the provincial component. The provincial 
contribution to fiscal deficit containment comes from four major heads: 
• interest payment by the provinces to the federal government; 
• recoveries of loan from provinces by the federal government;  
• self-financing of PSDP by provinces; and  
• the surplus in the provincial budget.   
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Table 1 
Who is Bearing the Burden of Stabilisation? 
(Revised Estimates in Rs Billion) 
Provincial Component 
Heads/ 
Years 
Total Interest 
Payments 
from 
Provinces 
Recovery of 
Loans from 
Provinces 
Self-financing 
of PSDP by 
Provinces 
Provincial 
Surplus 
Fiscal 
Deficit 
Provincial 
Component 
% of Fiscal 
Deficit 
1990-91 15.0 13.5 1.5 0.0 0.0 65.3 23.0% 
1991-92 17.6 15.9 1.7 0.0 0.0 93.7 18.8% 
1992-93 20.1 18.0 2.1 0.0 0.0 95.6 21.1% 
1993-94 22.5 20.1 2.4 0.0 0.0 99.1 22.7% 
1994-95 29.7 21.9 2.8 5.0 0.0 109.6 27.1% 
1995-96 36.8 22.7 3.4 10.7 0.0 132.4 27.8% 
1996-97 43.2 24.2 5.0 14.0 0.0 153.3 28.2% 
1997-98 35.7 26.1 5.8 3.9 0.0 141.0 25.3% 
1998-99 35.7 25.5 6.4 3.9 0.0 103.4 34.6% 
1999-00 57.8 28.3 8.0 6.8 14.8 122.0 47.4% 
2000-01 59.3 29.4 9.0 20.5 0.4 185.6 32.0% 
2001-02 56.6 29.5 10.1 15.4 1.6 257.1 22.0% 
2002-03 92.0 28.0 18.8 28.7 16.6 181.3 50.7% 
2003-04* 96.7 26.9 11.8 30.0 28.0 175.3 55.2% 
Source: Federal Budget in Brief and Explanatory Memorandum of Federal Receipts. 
          * Budget Estimates. 
 
Table 1 shows fiscal deficit, Rs 65.3 billion in 1990-91, increased to 181.3 
billion in 2002-03. Over the same period, containment of fiscal deficit by 
provinces increased from Rs 15 billion to Rs 92 billion. Thus while the fiscal 
deficit has grown at an annual average rate of 8.8 percent, the containment of 
fiscal deficit by provincial governments has grown at 16.3 percent. As a result of 
this sharp increase in the provincial contribution the share of containment of 
fiscal deficit increased from 23 percent of fiscal deficit in 1990-91 to 51 percent 
in 2002-03.  This implies that if this contribution were not there, the budget 
deficit would have increased by 23 percent in 1990-91 and by 51 percent in 
2002-03. This clearly shows that the onus of containment of budget deficit is 
placed on the provincial governments.  
Among the provincial components, maximum growth has registered in the 
recoveries of loans segment, with its share in the containment of fiscal deficit rising 
from 2 percent in 1990-91 to 10 percent in 2002-03. Self-financing of Public Sector 
Development Programme (PSDP) commenced in 1994-95 and its share in the 
containment of fiscal deficit has risen from less than 5 percent to about 16 percent in 
2002-03. The provincial budget surplus commenced in 1999-2000 and constituted 9 
percent of the fiscal deficit in 2002-03. For 2003-04, its share of provincial budget 
surplus is projected to nearly double, reaching 16 percent. 
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2.  Implications of the NFC Awards of 1991 and 1997 
Changes in the 1991 and the 1997 National Finance Commission (NFC) 
Awards are the major instruments that curtailed provincial fiscal space. Prior to the 
1990 NFC Award, the provincial governments were allowed to have deficit in their 
budgets which then were financed by the federal government in the form of deficit 
grants. The 1990 NFC Award deleted the provision for federal deficit grants to the 
provinces. This deletion requires provinces to limit expenditures correspond to their 
resources and since the establishment expenditures are more or less fixed, the only 
scope for expenditure reduction lies in social sector expenditures and impacted 
directly on social service delivery. However the federal government decided to 
continue to cover the expenditures of the provincial component of the PSDP, which 
meant that provincial development activities continued to proceed. 
The 1997 NFC Award introduced few major changes having far reaching 
impacts on provincial finances. First, provision for federal financing of the provincial 
component of PSDP was withdrawn and provinces were required to finance their 
own development expenditures. Second, no tax bases were transferred to the 
provinces to enable them to finance this additional burden and therefore every rupee 
of development expenditure incurred by the provincial governments needs a cut into 
other expenditures. 
Thirdly, before the 1990 Award the customs duties did not form part of the 
divisible pool and the federal government used to retain the entire proceeds. 
However the income tax and sales tax were part of the divisible pool and the federal 
government after retaining 20 percent of the proceeds and 80 percent were 
distributed among the provinces. The 1997 Award redefined the federal divisible 
pool and the revenue sharing formula. The Award included all taxes in the federal 
divisible pool and changed the federal and provincial share to 62.5 percent and 37.5 
percent respectively. 
At this point of time the federal government began to implement the crucial 
part of its structural adjustment reforms-scaling down customs duties drastically and 
expanding sales taxes significantly. Had the 1991 Award distribution arrangement 
continued, the provinces would have borne no burden of the decline in customs duty 
revenues and would have received 80 percent of the additional revenues from sales 
tax? With the courtesy of the 1997 Award the federal government shifted one-third 
of the loss from customs duties to the provinces and enhanced its share in the sales 
tax revenues by over 40 percentage points. Therefore, from the provincial viewpoint, 
the NFC 1997 brought two bad news on revenue side. First the provincial 
governments now have to share with the federal government the fall in the custom 
duties and second allow federal government to share with them in the increase in 
sales revenues. 
Under the new scenario of the reduced provincial receipts from the federal 
divisible pool and the additional burden of PSDP expenditure, the provincial 
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governments were allowed to take loans from the federal government to finance their 
deficits. The situation is further aggravated when the federal government charges a 
very high interest rate on these loans. This high interest rate was also not justified on 
economic grounds because the federal government borrowed at lower rates from 
abroad and lends it to provincial governments at higher rates.  
In last several years, such developments have squeezed the fiscal space for the 
provinces, leaving little to spend on the provision of social services. The provincial 
share of financing the federal fiscal deficit, as a percentage of total provincial 
expenditures, has risen from 17 percent in 1990-91 to 29 percent in 2002-03. If the 
provinces were not pressed to share the federal fiscal deficit, they would have had Rs 
92 billion, or 29 percent, more at their disposal in 2002-03. 
 
3.  IMPACT ON SOCIAL SERVICES EXPENDITURES 
Adequate provision of social services is a concurrent function of federal and 
provincial governments, however, in Pakistan, the financing and delivery of social 
services largely rest with the provinces but major sources of revenues in the hand of 
federal government. The changes in 1991 and 1997 NFC Awards (discussed in 
previous section) and other efforts of federal government to transfers burden of 
stabilisation on provincial governments put uneasy pressure on provincial finances. 
This left provincial governments with three options: increase efforts to mobilise 
higher revenues from own resources, curtailed expenditure and finally increase 
borrowing. Since federal government collects all buoyant taxes, the scope for 
increase in tax collection from provincial own resources is minimum. The persistent 
higher burden of debt, debt servicing and limited power of loan negotiation 
minimises the scope for option three. Therefore, the only option left with provinces 
is to reduce services delivery. An empirical study [Sabir (2001)] shows that the 
impact of shortfalls in federal transfers to the provinces largely affected provincial 
social sector expenditures than any other provincial expenditures.  
Table 2 presents the average annual growth rates in provincial expenditures 
during three periods prior to 1991 NFC award  (1981-1990), after 1991 NFC Award 
and finally after 1997 NFC Award. Table 2 shows that average growth in provincial 
expenditures has declined from 16.7 percent prior to 1991 NFC Award to 15.3 
percent after 1991 NFC Award. Moreover after the 1997 NFC Award the growth rate 
further decline to 9.3 percent. The same trend persists in both recurring and 
development expenditures. 
However, the growth pattern in social and non-social sector expenditures 
indicate that the main victim of the containment of fiscal deficit by province is social 
services expenditure and not the non-social sector expenditures. The growth in social 
expenditure has declined from 17.7 percent prior to 1991 NFC Award to a meager 
4.3 percent in after 1997 NFC Award.   
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Table 2 
Impact of Fiscal Deficit Containment on Provincial Expenditures 
(Average Growth in Real Expenditures—Four Province Combined) 
  1981-1990 1991-1997 1998-2002 
Provincial Recurring Expenditure    
  Social Service 19.1% 18.9% 6.4% 
  Non-social Service 16.8% 15.3% 10.9% 
  Total 17.5% 16.5% 9.2% 
Provincial Development Expenditure   
  Social Services 15.6% 11.0% –5.4% 
  Non-social Service 14.5% 15.5% 20.6% 
  Total  14.9% 13.0% 10.2% 
Total Provincial Expenditure    
  Social Services 17.7% 16.7% 4.3% 
  Non-social Service 16.2% 14.5% 12.3% 
  Total  16.7% 15.3% 9.3% 
Source: Estimates based on Provincial ABS (Various Issues). 
 
1.  Impact on Provincial Public Spending on Education 
The impact of containment of fiscal deficit can also be seen from the trends in 
expenditures on education. Education expenditure data for all the provinces 
combined have been organised along four time periods: 1975-85, 1986-90, 1991-97, 
and 1998-2002. The rationale for the time periods is determined by four events: the 
1974 NFC Award, the launching of the Five Point Programme in 1985-86, the 1991 
NFC Award, and the 1997 NFC Award. As such, 1975-85 represents the pre-Five 
Point Programme period; 1986-89 represents the post-Five Point Programme and 
pre-1991 NFC Award period; 1991-97 represents the period under the 1991 NFC 
Award; and 1998-2002 represents the period under the 1997 NFC Award. 
The trends in annual average growth rates in real education expenditures, 
presented in Chart I and II, show that growth in real expenditures on education 
peaked across the board from 1986 to 1990. By contrast, there were declines across 
the board during 1991-97 period, and growth collapsed from 1998 to 2002. During 
the 1998-2002 period, real recurring expenditure on education increased by only 1 
percent, while real development expenditure declined by 11 percent. In primary and 
secondary education, growth was reduced from about 9 percent during the 1991-97 
period to less than one percent for primary education and a negative two percent for 
secondary education. 
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Chart I.  Growth in Provincial Real Expenditures on Education. 
 
 
 
Chart II.  Growth in Level-wise Recurring Expenditure on Education. 
 
 
 
It appears that the thrust of macroeconomic policy, with its excessive stress on 
stabilisation objectives, has seriously affected the capacity of the provincial 
governments to invest in education. Clearly, a change of direction is warranted. It is 
imperative that macroeconomic policy should not contradicts the objectives of social 
and economic growth. 
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2.  Impact on Health Expenditures 
Similar to the growth pattern in education, growth in real expenditures on 
health reached its peak during 1986-90, which is the period prior to 1991 NFC 
Award. After 1991 NFC Award and 1997 NFC Award development expenditures on 
health experience negative growth ranges negative 8 percent to 12 percent.  During 
1990s growth in recurring expenditures on health also decline from 13 percent prior 
to 1991 NFC Award to 6 percent after 1991 NFC Award.  
 
Chart III.  Growth in Provincial Real Expenditures on Health. 
 
 
4.  CONCLUSION AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
Our analysis shows that the process of shifting the burden of stabilisation 
to the lower tiers of the government has seriously shrank the capacity of the 
provincial governments to invest in social services. This resulted in low social 
expenditures and consequently poor social conditions. It is imperative that 
macroeconomic policy should not contradict the objectives of social-economic 
growth. Therefore, some alternative mechanism to support provinces on fiscal 
front may be suggested. For instance, so far the federal government only enjoyed 
the fruit of rescheduling of foreign debt and reduction in interest rate on 
borrowing. This benefit must be transmitted to the provinces by offering them 
the opportunity to refinance their debt burden on present low interest rate. 
Similarly, the social sector expenditure of the provincial government may be 
protected in the new NFC Award, and the federal government must finance part 
of the public sector development of the provinces. 
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